Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Rule following, philosophy: is an expression for a problem that L. Wittgenstein formulated by excluding that a person could follow a rule that applies only to them as an individual. See also private language, rules, feelings, meaning, beetle example._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Rule Following - Dictionary of Arguments
Newen I 35 Rule-following/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: is a competence - without justification or consideration - rule: not fixed, but something that we feel bound to. - VsWittgenstein: Problem: uncertainty of usages. ((s) For the philosophical discussion of Wittgenstein's theory of rule following cf. >Kripke's Wittgenstein.) --- Stegmüller IV 120 Rule-following/Wittgenstein: assertibility conditions are impossible for private rule-following because community does not exist. --- Hintikka I 243 Rule/Philosophical Investigations/Wittgenstein: rule-following is nothing more than acting in accordance with a rule. This view is rejected by Wittgenstein initially: in the Blue Book, he rejects the view, the teaching of language is a mere drill. For the logically-thought out language use applies, "that the rule is included in the understanding, obeying, etc., if the symbol for the rule forms part of the calculation." Vs: Problem: so Wittgenstein is not satisfied in the long run, because it leads to regress .. How do we know that we follow the signs correctly? What does it mean to follow the sign expression of a rule? I 244 Later, Philosophical Investigations §§ 143 242: following a rule is analog to: following a command. One is trained to it and one responds to it in a certain way. Problem: what if one reacts differently to a command and drill? Who is right then? The common human behavior is the reference system (i.e., not behaviour, which would be common for all humanity, on the contrary, his writings contain many references that Wittgenstein is relativist in terms of language and culture.) With this last remark Wittgenstein gives a different answer than in the Blue Book or the Philosophical Remarks. Rule/rule-following/late/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: new: it is suspected that someone does not really follow the rule but only acts ((s) randomly) in accordance with it, Wittgenstein later does not want to raise the question whether the person concerned thinks of a certain sign formulation, or what role a specific codification of the rule plays. He wants to get to that with the late formulation: "God, if he had looked into our souls, he would have not been able to see of whom we were talking." I 245 Whether I act perhaps out of fear rather than in accordance with the rule (with the same result) I do not determine, in looking into my soul, but: by asking: "Has he ever been trained to perform commands? Ultimately, the answer can only come from the community framework of behaviors that are common to me and the other. Language game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein calls this broader horizon language game. Only in this context questions of the rule-following can be posed usefully. The task of the actually played language games cannot be satisfied by rules as far as their linguistic or symbolic expressions are concerned with these. I 257 The rule-following can only be understood in terms of language games. Certain psychological words express no conscious processes: for example, "understand" in the expression "to understand a rule." > Consciousness/Wittgenstein. I 267 The rule-following is not based on criteria. I 311 Rule-following/Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations § 202: "Following the rule" is a practice. And believing to follow the rule is not following the rule." --- II 111 Rule-following/Wittgenstein: "following rules" is an ambiguous term. 100 lines on the blackboard are equal to 101 lines in the visual space. II 121 Rule-following/rule/game/Wittgenstein: if one sets the rules for a game, then one does not really follow them during playing. Chess is not played with constant reference to the rules. But one cannot say, either one is merely a parrot or one looks up the rules. The matter is much more complicated. Why are primitive games without rules called games? II 265 Series/following/Wittgenstein: Knowing how the sequel is, is never only seeing a formula - one also needs the experience that he continues the series. --- VI 161 Rule-following/Wittgenstein/Schulte: is a practice, therefore you cannot follow a rule "privately". Otherwise "believing to follow the rule" would be the same. VI 194 Rule-following/private/Wittgenstein/Schulte: It does not make sense to say that a human has followed a rule once. It would have to be part of an institutionalized practice. But it is so, that some authors, such as Descartes have stood for a similar position (>Private language). (VI 193/94)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, , München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Rule Following
